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Havighurst: Health Planning and Antitrust Law: The Implied Amendment Doctrine

HEALTH PLANNING AND ANTITRUST LAW:
THE IMPLIED AMENDMENT DOCTRINE OF
THE REX HOSPITAL CASE
CLARK

C.

HAVIGHURST*

In its 1982 decision in HospitalBuilding Co. r. Trustees of Re.% ttospital.' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit attempted to
devise a special antitrust rule for evaluating hospital conspiracies that
forestall competition by manipulating local health planning and state
regulatory processes. The court's reason for wanting a special. more
relaxed rule was its sense that Congress had encouraged competitors to
collaborate to curb the excessive growth of the hospital industry. Thus.
the court thought application of normal antitrust rules would punish
conduct that Congress favored and would promote competition that
Congress did not want unleashed. In Rex Hospital, the jury had
awarded treble damages of $7.3 million against defendants who had
done little, if anything, that was not customary in the hospital industry
at the time. Apparently the appeals court believed that it faced a difficult choice between either applying the law literally, thereby achieving
an unjust and perverse result, or fashioning an exception to established
antitrust principles.
This article argues that it was not necessary for the Rex Hospital
court to create an unprecedented exception to well-founded antitrust
rules in order to reach the result it wanted. The article's main topic.
however, is the doctrinal soundness of the method by which the court
arrived at a relaxed antitrust standard under which to examine the defendants' conduct. In particular. the discussion focuses on the court's
idea that federal statutes encouraging voluntary health planning supply
a basis for modifying antitrust law. The finding of an implied amendment to the antitrust laws in other federal legislation represents a potentially important doctrinal innovation, one that. though
unprecedented, was arguably foreshadowed in a footnote in the
Professor of Law. Duke Universaty. Work on this anicle was supported under Grant No.
IIS 04089 from the National Center for Health Services Research. U.S. Department of I ealth and
Human Services. Substantial portions have been adapted from material appearing in chapters 5
and 6 of the author's book. I')hRh-UL,a.TI(; 1il l I.ALTII CARL INDUSTRY: PLANNING I OR COMPi TITION (Cambridge. Mass- Ballinger Pubhshing Company. 1982).
1. 691 F.2d 678 t4th Cir 19 2).pe':tionsfor ceri.filed. 51 U.S.L.W. 3738 (U.S. April t. 1183)
tNo. 82-16331. id at 3807 (U S April 28. 1983) (No. 82-1762).
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Supreme Court's 1981 opinion in National Gerimedical Hospital and
Gerontologr Center r. Blue Cross.2 Although the courts have always
been willing to consider whether Congress, by enacting specific regulatory legislation. may have created an implied exemption from the antitrust laws in some narrow area made subject to regulatory oversight.
the Re.%Hospital decision embarks on a different line of statutory interpretation. The court appears to hold that, even when Congress has
done nothing that compels an inference of antitrust immunity in a particular case. a legislative relaxation of antitrust doctrine may nevertheless be inferred from the policy implications of other federal laws. The
interesting question raised by this decision is whether, in addition to
the long-recognized "implied repeal" (or "implied exemption") doctrine, the courts now also recognize an -implied amendment" doctrine.
In order to address the general appropriateness of inferring amendments to the antitrust laws from other congressional actions, this article
will eventually set aside the facts of Re.x Hospital itself and examine the
question in a different but closely related factual and legal context.
The specific issue considered is whether naked agreements among hospitals to reduce competition inter se. which would normally be per se
violations of the Sherman Act. can be defended on the ground that they
advance goals specified by federally supported health planners. This
specific issue-whether health planning goals can be implemented by
anticompetitive agreements-is of considerable current importance and
arises in a statutory and factual context more contemporary than Re
Hospital itself. Most importantly. it provides an excellent laboratory in
which to test the implications of the National Gerimedical footnote and
the Rex Htospital holding.
I.

Tili 1982 REI" /l(,SPT.,i

DECISION:

EssEN'IIAi. FACTS ANt)

HOL1INGS

The issue before the court of appeals involved events occurring from
1971 to 1973. Although the case was originally filed in October 1972. it
did not come to trial until the Supreme Court had resolved an important question of jurisdiction, which the lower federal courts had disclaimed but which the Supreme Court confirmed on the basis of the
volume of interstate commerce affected by competition among hospitals. ' After plaintiff won its verdict in a six-week trial, the court of
appeals reversed the judgment and remanded for another trial. Cross
petitions for another writ of certiorari were currently denied by the
2

452 U S 373. 1103n IN,(1141
Ihopital Bldg (o v 'ruste.s of Rcx IIo.,pltal. 425 U S 73K 1976
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Supreme Court.4
In its current posture. the case is factually and legally complex. and
this article does not explicate it fully. Instead, it focuses on those facts
and those aspects of the holding that relate to what the author refers to
as the courts newly fashioned doctrine of -implied amendment."
Among the issues in the case that are not discussed is an important
question concerning the proper scope of the so-called Noerr-Penninr'ton
doctrine.' That doctrine removes from antitrust scrutiny concerted efforts by competitors. through exercise of their rights in political, administrative, or judicial forums, to induce government to act in some lawful
manner-however harmful to competition and competitors that governmental action might be. Many of the concerted practices that the
jury relied upon in finding a violation in Rex Ho.spital were connected
to efforts to influence the outcome of state administrative proceedings,
and may therefore have been outside the reach of the antitrust laws as
authoritatively construed.'
A.

The Facts

Rex Hospital was triggered by events that occurred in connection
with plans of the plaintiff. Hospital Building Co. (HBC). to replace its
existing 40-bed hospital in Raleigh. North Carolina. by building a new
facility. HBC alleged that defendant Rex Hospital (Rex), a nonprotit
institution, and assorted co-conspirators-including Wake Memorial
Hospital (Wake), the only other general hospital in Raleigh--had hampered its expansion efforts by activities of two kinds. First. defendants
allegedly co-opted and manipulated the local health planning and state
4 See rupra note I. The )epanment of Justice filed a briel is ,anlu, 'triae ~kIing the
Court to grant plaintiffs petition and to deny defendants*
5 See Eastern R.R. Presidents ('onference v Nocrr Motor I-reight. In. . t35, 1*S 12"
1961). United Mine Workers v. Pennington. 381 U.S 657 1 1965). Ser a/io, lFischel..Inutnwt Li.,biltt rA, .4utenpi$ to Influence Goiernmewn Aron. The Bas.s an/ Linttv of h ".V.e'rr- Pennlltt1n
Dntrine. 45 U. CIt. L. Ri.v. 80 (1977).
6 The specific issue raised is the scope of the so-called 'sham*" exception to the imnunit,
that the Nverr-Pennngton doctrine provides for competitors participating in administrati,,e and
judicial proceedings See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited. 404 U.S 511S
119721. Compare Federal Prescription Serv.. Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Assn. 63 1- 2d
253. 261-68 (D.C. Cir. 1981). with Huron Valley losp. v. City of Pontiac. 466 F. Supp. 1301. 13l215 4E D. Mich. 1979). racazed. 666 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1981). Jurv instructions on this tsue ,were
found to be too favorable to the plaintiff in that they permitted the sham exception to be in'oked
simply upon a finding of a larger conspiracy rather than upon a specific showing of abuse of
process or denial of meaningful access to administrative or judicial forums The court's di.cu,sion. 691 F.2d at 687.88. still seems to endorse a relatively broad construction of the sham cxccption. apparently permitting - jury to find that defendants* opposition to plaintill' application
before an administrative agency. their petitioo for a rehearing, and a single appeal of an adscrc
decision to the courts were "baseless. repetitive and brought with the intent to ahuse the judicial
process." Id at 688. The court also narrowed the grounds upon which an attornc Ior the state
could he found to have been brought into the conspiracy. dcstrtying .Voerr.PennrnlrltnImmunit%
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regulatory processes to exclude plaintiff unfairly from the market. The
second set of allegations called into question the hospital reimbursement policies of the local Blue Cross plan. which were allegedly formulated in concert with Rex and Wake in order to discourage plaintiffs
initiative.
Plaintiff charged the co-conspirators with founding. in 1969. and
dominating thereafter, the Joint Long Range Hospital Planning Committee of Wake County. a body comprised of leading citizens and engaged in voluntary hospital planning for the community. In early 1971,
this committee drew up projections of future hospital needs in Raleigh.
providing for the eventual replacement of Rex's 347 beds by a 500-bed
new facility and for Wake's growth from 380 to 540 beds. According to
this plan. plaintiffs 40-bed facility was projected to grow to 60 beds.
but not to the 140-bed size that plaintiff had established as its own goal.
In plaintiffs view. this projected allocation of future beds among the
three Raleigh hospitals amounted to a plan to use the health planning
system to prevent plaintiff from becoming a significant competitive factor in the Raleigh market. Plaintiff also argued that this plan served to
illuminate subsequent events and to reveal the co-conspirators, anticompetitive purpose.
Defendants and their alleged co-conspirators were also charged with
manipulating the state's certificate-of-need program to prevent or delay
plaintiffs project. This regulatory program was enacted in mid- 1971 in
order to give teeth to voluntary health planning by conferring on a state
agency the power to approve or disapprove hospital building proposals
on the basis of "need." Need determinations were to be based on.
among other things, recommendations by 'areawide health planning
agencies." which included the Health Planning Council of Central
North Carolina. a private body financed in part by federal grants. The
delendants allegedly brought the director of this agency into their conspiracy, misrepresented facts to the regulators. filed frivolous and dilatory appeals. and induced a lawyer for the state regulatory agency to
assist their efforts behind the scenes. Although these efforts were not
successful in getting the project turned down, the)' did delay it substantially. resulting in the damages awarded. In early 1973. before plaintiff
had overcome the defendants' various challenges, the certificate-ofneed law was declared unconstitutional," thereby removing the major
legal roadblock to plaintiff's project.
Plaintiff next alleged that the invalidation of the state regulatory
program caused the defendants to shift their attention to using Blue
Cross to forestall plaintiffs expansion. One month after the certificateof-need law was ruled unconstitutional. Blue Cross adopted a policy of
7

In rc Ccrtificate of Need for Aton Park I Iop.. Inc.. 282 N C 542. 193 S I: 2d 729 (1973)
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refusing to reimburse the capital costs, including a return on equity
capital, of hospitals constructed without the approval of the voluntary
health planners. Plaintiff charged that this policy and Blue Cross's allegedly discriminatory method of reimbursing proprietary institutions
were in furtherance of a long-standing conspiracy between Blue Cross
and nonprofit hospitals to exclude proprietary firms, such as HBC.
from doing hospital business in the state.
B.

The Rulings

The trial court concluded that the alleged practices. if proved, would
constitute per se violations of the Sherman Act and instructed the jury
accordingly. On the basis of this ruling, the defendants were denied an
opportunity to defend their involvement in the voluntary health planning effort as a constructive effort to prevent the unnecessary duplication of health care resources in the Raleigh area. On appeal from the
jury verdict for the plaintiff, the court of appeals found that the trial
court's instruction improperly precluded the defense that the defendants engaged in health planning in good faith and not for anticompetitive purposes and were similarly motivated in participating in the
regulatory process. The court was less than clear about whether the
alleged conspiracy with Blue Cross could likewise be excused if defendants' motives were pure, but appears to have so held.
The court of appeals carefully recognized only a narrow exception to
the usual rule that the antitrust laws do not permit defenses based on
either the inappropriateness of competition in a particular market context or the worthy purposes for which competition was curtailed.' Despite the narrowness of the usual rule-of-reason inquiry, however, the
court reasoned that, because Congress had itself revealed some doubts
about the desirability of unbridled competition in the hospital industry
and had taken substantial steps to foster voluntary health planning as a
partial antidote to the problem of excessive nonprice competition
among health care providers, a broader inquiry would be appropriate
in cases involving hospitals and health planning. As a consequence. it
spelled out an affirmative defense that defendants should be allowed to
offer at a new trial:
We think a very narrow 'rule of reason' is required in order to permit
defendants to show. if they can. that participation in certain planning
activities that would otherwise violate § I might not under the circumx. "rh'srule received its most forceful explication in National Soc'v of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States. 435 U.S. 679 1978). where the Society had argued that competitive bidding ,"or
engineering contracts. -hich it had prohibited by an ethical canon. was likely to lead to inferior
and unsafe construction. The Supreme Court stated flatly in reply that "statutory policy precludes
inquir) into the question whether competition is good or bad." Id at 695. See infra note 24 and
text accompan)ing note 58.
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stances have been an unreasonable restraint on trade. The appropriate
rule. we find. is simply that planning activities of private health services
providers are not "unreasonable' restraints under § I if undertaken in
good faith and if their actual and'intended effects lay within those envisioned by specific federal legislation in place at the time of the challenged activities as desirable consequences of such planning activities.'
In a confusing passage, the court stated that a finding of "good faith
participation in planning activities aimed at avoiding the needless duplication of health care resources" could be made only if the fact finder
found that "the 'duplication of resources' sought to be avoided by planning . . . is in fact 'needless' duplication." 10 Because the health planners themselves had agreed that Raleigh needed additional hospital
beds, it is hard to see why there was any doubt that HBC's project.
which was subsequently granted a certificate of need, did not unnecessarily duplicate facilities. The only real question was who would be
allowed to provide the needed additional beds-HBC, Rex, or Wakeand in what proportion. If that was the issue, it is also hard to see why
Rex and Wake had not, on the facts presented, already violated the
court's precept that "' planning' under this special rule of reason is not
.reasonable' if its purpose or effect is only to protect existing health care
providers from the competitive threat of potential entrants into or expanders within the same 'market.' "" It is also hard to understand why
the jury. in finding defendants guilty of a conspiracy to monopolize
under section 2 of the Sherman Act, had not already found that the
defendants lacked the good faith essential to their defense.
Perhaps the court was saying in these passages nothing more than
that participation in federally encouraged health planning is not objectionable per se and cannot be the basis for a finding of anticompetitive
intent. Under the antitrust rule of reason, a showing of competitors'
anticompetitive intent can support an inference of probable harm to
competition. that is,
a restraint of trade. As the following discussion
shows, it is not at all troublesome as antitrust doctrine to require that
findings of conspiracy to monopolize and of harm to competition be
based upon more than the co-conspirators' involvement in health planning. It is ironic that the court of appeals failed to appreciate that the
9
10

691 F 2d at 685.
Id at 686.

I I Id Although this language can be read to suggest that the defendants could claim that
their moties in seeking to exclude a competitor were pure and that their actions were bcneficial to
the public, the court stresscd repeatedly the narrowness of the defense it was allowing. Pcrmitting
the defendants to justify an explicit conspiracy to exclude plaintiff on such grounds a. that its
ho,.pital was incficiently small or that its for-profit status compromised quality or the accc.%, of
indigent patients to health care would not amount to "only a modest practical modification of the
per le rule applicd below." Id
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result it wanted could probably have been reached without inventing a
new approach to construing federal antitrust legislation.
C.

Was DoctrinalInnovation Necessary?

Both sides approached the argument before the court of appeals on
the premise that, unless a repeal or relaxation of the antitrust laws
could be inferred on the basis of other legislation, per se violations had
been successfully made out. The court of appeals did not pause to examine this assumption, stating only that "Itihe violations HBC asserts it
proved in this case-[a] horizontal market allocation scheme and a
concerted refusal to deal-are generally per se violations of the antitrust laws."'! Careful comparison of legal doctrine with the allegations
submitted to the jury raises real doubt, however, that either of the specified types of per se violation was present in the case, and therefore
suggests that the court may have done unnecessary violence to antitrust
analysis in designing its special rule of reason. Indeed, some of the
conduct that formed the basis of plaintiff's allegations may not, under
the rule of reason, have been a violation at all. Thus, the court may
have invented an unprecedented "good faith" defense for conduct that,
properly evaluated, needed no defense that is not supplied by accepted
doctrine. It would not be productive to argue these points at great
length, but an outline of the argument may be instructive in demonstrating that antitrust law can be intelligently applied and does not
compel perverse results in specific cases.
"Horizontal market allocation" is indeed a per se violation of the
antitrust laws. Properly understood, however, that label refers to horizontal division of market-that is.
agreements among competitors not
to compete across geographic or product lines.' 3 In Rex, the health
care facilities plan drawn up by the Joint Committee with the participation of Rex and Wake would amount to a market-allocation agreement
only if the hospitals had agreed to abide by the plan by providing only
the services assigned to them or locating their facilities at prescribed
points. More importantly, even if such an agreement eliminating or
reducing competition between Rex and Wake were established, it could
not have harmed HBC, which was not a party to the agreement and
remained free to act independently. Similarly, if Rex and Wake had
agreed to limit output, that arguable per se violation, far from affecting
HBC adversely, would have actually expanded its market opportunities. Obviously, HBC's complaint was not about market allocation as
such but about an alleged additional conspiracy by Rex and Wake to
12. Id at 684.
13. See United States v. Topco Assocs.. Inc.. 405 U.S. 596 (1972): Timken Roller Bearing Co.
v. United States. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
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curb HBC's growth in some illegitimate way. However. such a conspiracy would have to be proved specifically and requires some showing of
anticompehitive intent-which is precisely what the court of appeals
has required Rex and Wake to negate (rather than HBC to show) on
retrial.
The other asserted per se violation, a "concerted refusal to deal,"
apparently involved the discriminatory practices of Blue Cross. particularly in refusing to pay HBC's capital costs and a return on its equity
investment unless the planners approved its project. As an independent business entity. Blue Cross is free within very broad limits to decide
the terms upon which it will deal with others; indeed, the exercise of
such business discretion is essential to operating a competitive market. 4 On the other hand, a true concerted refusal to deal, or group
boycott, involves the agreement of several competitors to forgo independent selection of customers or suppliers. Although the term
"'bovcott" has frequently been misapplied to a refusal to deal by a single entity controlled by or collaborating with competitors of the ultimate victim.'" the per se label has generally been reserved for boycotts
that represent agreed-upon refusals to deal by multiple actors in a hori6
zontal relationship with each other.'
In Re.r, Blue Cross did not act in concert with other insurers and was
therefore not engaged in a classic boycott subject to the per se rule.
Plaintiff claimed, however, that Blue Cross (which was not a defendant) conspired with Rex and Wake to discourage HBC's expansion by
establishing burdensome terms of dealing. Although such a "vertical"
conspiracy is sometimes referred to as a concerted refusal to deal and
in any event would violate the law,' it could be proved only by showing the anticompetitive motives of the conspirators."' Thus, once
again, the intent which the court of appeals wants demonstrated in a
new trial under its "special rule of reason" appears to be an essential
14
15

See n/a note 43 and accompanying text.
E . L. SULLIVAN. HANDBOOK OF IlE L.w oF ANTITRUST 243-44 (1977): Virginia Acad-

cm% (if Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield. 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980).
16 It also appears to be essential that the boycott threaten harm to competition involving
,ome party to the arrangement and not merely harm at some other level of the market. See genera/ir St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry. 438 U.S. 531 (1978): United States v. General
Motors. Inc.. 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Radiant Burners v. Peoples Gas. Light & Coke Co.. 364 U.S.
656 (1961): Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores. Inc.. 359 U.S. 207 (1959): Fashion Originators
Guild v. FTC. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
17. See. e.g.. Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co.. 684 F.2d 1226. 1235 n.4 (7th Cir.
19821. cert. granted. 51 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. Feb. 28. 1983) (No. 82-914) (-Monsanto. however.
could not lawfully terminate Spray-Rite's distributorship pursuant to an agreement with its distributors because such conduct is a concerted refusal to deal which is per se unlawful even if not
pan of a scheme to fix resale prices").
18 Although such vertical agreements to eliminate a competitor are unlawful, such a con-piracy is difficult to prove, requiring proof of motive. Thus. the per sc label is misleading in
,.Er.egesting that motive is not an element of the offense. See infra note 20 and cases cited.
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element of the offense under traditional doctrine. If Blue Cross acted
for business reasons of its own'" and not simply as the cat's paw of Rex
and Wake in an attempt to eliminate HBC, it is probable that no violation occurred.20
Perhaps the best way to give effect to the court of appeal's ruling in
retrying the Rex case would be to instruct the jury that joint participation by the competitors Rex and Wake in voluntary health planning
cannot be given an adverse construction in and of itself. Ordinarily.
meetings between competitors to discuss their future business plans are
highly suspect and can serve as evidence of a naked conspiracy to coordinate future actions if no other purpose appears. Here, however, the
extensive encouragement to voluntary health planning given by the
federal government and others, including insurers and major financers
of hospital construction, amounted to a strong invitation to parley and
would seem to neutralize any adverse inferences that might otherwise
be drawn from participation in planning. Indeed, it seems likely that
this was all that the court of appeals, in its own peculiar way, was
saying.
Competitor collaboration to collect and share information on market
developments and to advise governmental and nongovernmental bodies concerning the state of the market is not legally objectionable in
itself." ' even though the obvious and substantial risks to competition
presented by such collective action justify close scrutiny. 22 The defendants in Rex should certainly be free to claim that their planning had no
purpose other than its official one-namely, to advise federal and state
funding agencies, private philanthropists, Blue Cross, potential lenders.
and other investors of the nature and existence of unmet health care
needs and to suggest efficient ways of meeting such needs. An antitrust
19 A comparable issue was presented in the National Gerimedical case. See in/ira note 43
and accompanying text.
20. Vertical restraints imposed on a dealer by a manufacturer at the behest of its other dealers present issues analogous to the instant situation. See supra note 17. In Valley Liquors. Inc. v.
Renfield Importers. 678 F.2d 742. 743-44 (7th Cir. 1982). Judge Posner suggested that the business
purposes of the seller in refusing to deal were crucial and that a conspiracy would be found only if
the seller acted as his distrbutors" -cat's paw." Other decisions are somewhat quicker to find a
vertical agreement. See. eg.. Battle v. Lubrizol Corp.. 712 F.2d 1238 (8th Cit. 1983); Roesch. Inc.
v. Star Cooler Corp.. 712 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1983); Edward J. Sweeney & Sons. Inc. v. Texaco.
Inc.. 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cit. 1980). cert. denied. 451 U.S. 911 (1981). The Supreme Court may
clarify the law on such vertical agreements in reviewing Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto
Co.. 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982). cer. granted. 51 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. Feb. 28. 1983) (No. 82914).
21. E.g.. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States. 268 U.S. 563 (1925); McCann v. New
York Stock Exch.. 107 F.2d 908. 912 (2d Cir. 1939).
22. See. e.g.. United States v. Container Coip.. 393 U.S. 333 (1969); American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States. 257 U.S. 377 (1921); Eastern States Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v..United
States. 234 U.S. 600 (1914) (data dissemination apparently inducing anticompetitive collaborative
behavior).
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violation would occur only if the alleged conspirators went further and
agreed either to abide by the plan (an agreement that would not harm a
competitor such as HBC) or to force plaintiff to abide by it. The court
of appeals must have thought that the jury had not been clearly instructed concerning the basis upon which it could find a conspiracy of
the latter type.
The Rex court caused unnecessary trouble by the way in which it
cast its holding. Its opinion is probably best understood as not creating
any unprecedented exception to basic antitrust principles at all. Nevertheless, whatever the proper analysis and result on the particular facts
of the case, the court's stated holding raised a central issue of statutory
construction and antitrust policy. The remainder of this article addresses that issue in a different but closely related statutory and factual
context.
Ii.

AGREEMENTS TO IMPLEMENT THE GOALS OF HIEAL'll PLANNERS

The court of appeals in Rex was not called upon to decide whether
the two competing hospitals. in addition to participating in health planning. could lawfully agree with each other to abide by the planners'
determinations, thereby giving up their competitive independence.
Nevertheless, the court's express formulation of its holding, quoted
above, suggests that such anticompetitive agreements would be lawful
if they were entered into in good faith and for purposes that Congress.
judging from its other pronouncements, would probably regard as worthy. Because naked agreements in restraint of trade are normally per se
violations, a holding to this effect would amount to a major doctrinal
change. Under the court's formulation, antitrust defendants of all
kinds would be free to argue that their anticompetitive agreements.
normally violative of the Sherman Act, carried out in good faith some
other congressional policy. Not only would statutes encouraging private "'planning" invite arguments of this variety. 23 but other congressional indications of doubt about the benefits of vigorous competition
could be cited to justify special antitrust treatment.2 4 In short, the door
23 In its Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22-23 and App. F. llostpitalBldg. Co. V 7)'s,-ee of
Rex llosp.. 691 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 19 82).peitionfor cert.filed. 51 U.S.L.W. 3738 (U S. April 6.
1983) (No. 82-1633). plaintiff argued that. under the court of appeals decision. 23 ctted federal
statutes permitting local "planning- could be deemed to immunize antitrust violations.
24. In National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). the
Supreme Court refused to conclude that congressional lack of confidence in competition signaled
an intention to relax the antitrust laws. There Congress. through the Brooks Act. 40 U S.C.
541-544 (1970). had determined not to require competitive bidding for government purchases
of engineering services. The Court stated:
The Society relies heavily on the Brooks Act as evidence that its ban on competitive bidding
is reasonable. The argument is without merit. The Brooks Act does not even purport to
exempt engineering services from the antitrust laws. and the reasonableness of an individual
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would be open for arguments that Congress had amended the normal
antitrust rules by legislation implying less than total faith in competition as a mechanism for controlling some area of economic activity.
The legality of anticompetitive agreements to implement goals established through federally sponsored health planning has received specific attention under federal legislation enacted since the Rex case
arose. An analysis of this issue will serve to demonstrate both the operation of the implied repeal doctrine and the difficulties that would arise
if an implied amendment doctrine, such as the Rex court seemed to
announce, were also recognized. Detailed consideration of the legislation is necessary to reveal the dangers of trying to deduce Congress's
policies from evidence other than clear statutory language.
A.

Public Law 93-641 and the CVHS4 Problem

In 1974. Congress adopted the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act.2" This law clearly placed the federal government behind the movement to regulate hospital growth by requiring
the states, under penalty of losing substantial federal funds, to enact
certificate-of-need laws similar to the one invalidated in North Carolina.26 The statute also provided for the creation of local "health systems agencies" (HSAs), most of which turned out to be private
nonprofit corporations rather than public agencies and all of which
were required to include provider representatives as well as consumer
representatives on their governing boards. The HSAs were assigned
purchaser's decision not to seek lower prices through competition docs not authorize the vendors to conspire to impose that same decision on all other purchasers.
(435 U S. at 695. n.21l
Though the Court used only the language of implied repeal, it was clearly rejecting a request for
implied amendment of the antitrust laws to permit a weighing of worhy purposes in rule-ofreason analysis.
Perhaps the most telling authority against implying amendments of the antitrust laws from
congressional sentiments is the leading case of United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.. 3 It) U S.
150 (1940). That case condemned a price stabilization scheme that was very much in keeping with
Congress's 1930's policy of promoting industry "'codes of fair competition." attenuating competition in depressed industries. The Court stated:
The fact that the buying programs may have been consistent with the general objectives and
ends sought to be obtained under the National Industrial Recovery Act is likewise irrelevant
to the legality under the Sherman Act of respondents* activities either prior to or after [the
act's expiranon]. For as we have seen price-fixing combinations which lack Congressional
sanction are illegal per se: they are not evaluated in terms of their purpose. aim or effects in
the elimination of so-called competitive evils.
Id at 227-28.
nladthe Court not resisted the invitation to infer a weakening of antitrust policy from Congress's
general faith in the efficacy of benign cartels, the Sherman Act would have become virtually impossible to administer.
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (1976).
26. After North Carolina's law was found to violate the state'. constitution, the state challenged Public Law 93-641 unsuccessfully on federal constitutional grounds. See North Carolina
er re/ Morrow v Califano. 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977). afld nem.. 435 U.S. 962 (197X).
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the tasks of developing local health systems plans and advising -state
health planning and resource development agencies" (SHPDAs) on the
appropriateness-.of granting certificates of need in particular cases.
This legislation and its legislative history obviously strengthened
whatever argument might be made on behalf of health planners and
hospitals to the effect that the antitrust laws should not be given their
normal effect where planning is in the background.
In late 1978, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice received a request by the Central Virginia HSA (CVHSA) for a "business
review letter" indicating a favorable opinion from an antitrust standpoint of certain activities, including its efforts to gain providers' voluntary compliance with its recommendations for the closing, conversion.
and consolidation of services. Because these efforts involved the HSA
in negotiations with competing providers and gave rise to the possibility of providers' mutual withdrawal from competition under tacit or
even explicit anticompetitive agreements. a severe antitrust problem
was presented. The Antitrust Division naturally addressed this problem under the doctrine of implied repeal. a settled principle of statutory
construction holding that exemptions from the antitrust laws are not
"lightly" attributed to Congress. 27 An implied repeal of the antitrust
laws in a particular field will normally not be found unless there is a
.'clear repugnancy" between a statutory regulatory scheme and antitrust doctrine-that is. where the exemption is necessary to make the
regulatory program work in accordance with Congress's declared
intention.
Under the implied repeal doctrine, the Antitrust Division would
have been justified in refusing to give its blanket approval to the
CVHSA's implementation activities. The original Public Law 93-641
provided no statutory basis for inferring an exemption from the usual
antitrust rules governing agreements among competitors to limit output
or divide markets. The involvement of an HSA as a quasi-public overseer of the process would obviously make the case different from a typical cartel agreement, but under the implied repeal doctrine this
difference would amount to a decisive legal distinction only if Congress
had adequately revealed an intention to authorize HSAs to approve or
broker agreements that would otherwise violate the law. Because Public Law 93-641 included no explicit antitrust exemption, congressional
intent had to be ascertained by inference.
Public Law 93-641 and its legislative history contained numerous in27. St". e.g.. National Gerimedcal Hosp. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cro.s. 452 U.S. 378.

388-h 9 11981): Gordon v. New York Stock Exch.. 422 U.S. 659. 682 (1975): United State%v National Ass'n of Securities Dcalers. 422 U.S. 694. 719-20 (1975) (discusecd infra note 461: Silver v
New York Stock Exch.. 373 U.S. 341. 357 (1963): United State!. v. Philadelphia Nai'l Bank. 374
U.S. 321. 348. 350-51 (1963): California v. FPC. 369 U.S. 482. 485 11961)
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dications that Congress wished the HSAs to do something about industry overcapacity and duplication of resources. For example, the law
attached importance to planning efforts leading to 'the development of
multi-institutional systems for coordination or consolidation of institutional health services." 28 Moreover, provisions on "appropriateness"
review " and the development of local and state health plans contemplated establishment of numerical objectives for the system. and several
provisions of the original enactment indicated Congress's desire that
these goals, once determined, be implemented by local efforts. Thus.
the HSAs' basic mandate included a direction to "reduce documented
inefficiencies, and implement the health plans of the agency."-- Specific
directions with respect to plan implementation included a mandate to
'seek, to the extent practicable. to implement its [plans] with the assistance of
individuals and public and private entities in its health service
13
area."
While some statutory language thus might be deemed to constitute
authority to seek the cooperation of providers in closing facilities or
curtailing services, the legislative history of Public Law 93-641 revealed
that the conference committee specifically eliminated language that
would have directed the HSA. upon finding in an appropriateness review that a service or facility was unneeded, to "work with the provider
of the service or with the facility, the state agency. and other appropriate persons for . . . elimination . . . of such service or facility."' Whether or not this clause w"Id have made a difference, its omission
and the lack of language specifically contemplating anticompetitive
agreements among competitors meant that the statute was not sufficiently specific concerning the methods by which an unneeded facility
could be eliminated to warrant finding an exemption under the implied
repeal doctrine. The stumbling block lay ultimately in Congress's failure to give either the HSA or the SHPDA power to bless anticompetitive agreements to comply with health plans and appropriateness
findings once they were duly promulgated. Even though concerted activity leading to specific health plans and to explicit recommendations
for closure or consolidation were probably protected under available
doctrines." an HSA could not, without running antitrust risks, do more
than persuade individual hospitals (or other providers) unilaterally to
29. 42 U.S C. § 300k-212) (1976).

29. Id 0 300'-2(g). 300Mrn-2(a)(6). See infra note 51.
30.

Id § 3Ol-2(a).

31. Id § 30(Y-2(c).
32. IL.R Rep No. 1640. 93d Cong.. 2d Ses.
At). Ni ws 7842. 7983.

33. The

,voerr-Pennington

(1974). reprlntedin 1974 U.S. Coin. Co... &

diwirine affords such protection. See infra note 40 and accumpa-

nying text
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conform to its wishes. The difficulty of avoiding carrying messages between competitors and participating in exchanges of assurances among
themM4 would have made the HSA's activities in these areas highly dangerous unless and until the antitrust issue was clarified.
B.

The Effects of the 1979 Health PlanningAmendments

This sharp conflict between substantial federal policies received early
attention as the 96th Congress, in 1978. turned its attention to developing legislation that eventually became the National Health Planning
and Resources Development Amendments of 1979. " Nevertheless,
those amendments did not expressly address the antitrust issue raised
by the CVHSA and made no attempt to satisfy the minimum requirements for judicially inferring a congressional intention to give the
agencies the power to immunize anticompetitive transactions from antitrust attack. The House committee report, revealing some awareness
of these requirements and their significance. noted that, although the
agencies were required to perform certain functions. including appropriateness reviews, "agency acts which are not necessary to carry out
such functions or which are outside the scope of title XV are not authorized and therefore not immune from the application of the antitrust
laws. "3 The report also listed the specific functions of HSAs that the
antitrust laws should not be construed to inhibit, conspicuously omitting the brokering of anticompetitive agreements. Because congressional staff members were specifically aware of the opportunity for
resolving the CVHSA problem by widening the regulators' power to
approve anticompetitive agreements, 3 71 decisive significance can be attached to the failure to grant such authority and even to allude to such
agreements as a desirable way of rationalizing the system.
The House committee report also endorsed antitrust as a general policy in the health care industry. Although it also noted that "unfettered
competition could further aggravate health system problems" and that
.a practical and realistic analysis of the health care industry argues for
exceptions to the rule," the discussion made clear that antitrust principles were set aside only to the extent that regulation was specifically
substituted." In keeping with established doctrine, the committee report did not invite the courts to consider whether competition is a desirable influence in particular circumstances or to decide the extent to
34. Cf. Interstate Circuit. Inc. v. United States. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
35 Public Health Service Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300 (1979).
36. li R. Ri.p. No. 190. 96th Cong.. Ist Sess. 54-55 (1979).
37. See C. ||AVIGIIURST. DEREGULATING TIlE HEALT1i CARE INI)LISTRy 131-40 (1982). Thl!
hitom of the 1979 amendments illuminates Congres!&s awareness of the antitrust issue and it!
intent in addresng it.
38. tI.R. REP. No. 190. 96th Cong.. Ist Sess. 54-56 (1979)_
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which it should be enforced in any situation where Congress had
neither expressly set the antitrust laws aside nor established a regulatory scheme that could not work in the absence of an exemption. Because health planning agencies do not have the statutory power to
immunize agreements among competitors, all such agreements for
merger, consolidation, sharing, conversion, or elimination of competing
services seemed, under traditional doctrine, to remain fully subject to
the rules of antitrust following the 1979 amendments.
C.

The Justice Department's 1980 Letter to the CVHSA

The contention has been made above that the only defensible reading of Public Law 93-641, as amended, is that Congress meant to leave
the antitrust laws in place as a check on anticompetitive arrangements
and activities not expressly contemplated in federal or state law. In
May 1980 the Antitrust Division declared its support for this view in
finally responding to the CVHSA's request for a ruling concerning its
plan implementation activities.3 ' The department's letter refused to
grant a blanket clearance to HSA-sponsored agreements among competitors. even those agreements effectuating the configuration of services embodied in a state or local health plan. Although the letter did
not state the full legal basis for its conclusion, its analysis was essentially that set forth above.
After stating its view of the law, the department indicated that it
would exercise its prosecutorial discretion with a view to broader policy
considerations. As a result, planning agencies and institutions cooperating with them in plan implementation probably run no serious risk of
antitrust prosecution as long as their activities are undertaken in good
faith and with recognition of competition's possible benefits. The conclusion of risklessness would not hold, however, if the actions taken
should adversely affect private parties who are in a position to bring a
private antitrust action; the courts do not have discretion comparable to
that of government prosecutors in deciding whether to give effect to the
law's requirements. The Rex case illustrates the risks.
Technical peculiarities in legal doctrine give rise to the somewhat
striking anomaly that, while it may be illegal for hospitals to agree
among themselves to abide by an HSA health plan once it is adopted, it
is clearly permissible for them to act in concert in helping to develop
the plan. This latter result flows from the judicial view (the Noerr-Pennington doctrine' 0 ) that the antitrust laws were not intended to prevent
collective petitioning of government such as is involved in developing a
39. Letter from Sanford M. Litvack. Assistant Attorney General. Antitrust Division. U.S.
Dept. of Justice. in the matter of Central Virginia Health Systems Agency. May 6. 1980.
40. See supra notes 5. 6. and 33 and accompanying text.
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health plan that is eventually to be approved or adopted by the state.
Because there is an ultimate political check on the plan development
process, there is arguably no need for antitrust courts to scrutinize private activity that precedes the promulgation of the plan. However.
even though the plan may appear to derive political legitimacy from
the participatory process by which it is developed, the health planning
legislation fails to give it any explicit legal or other effect except in the
certificate-of-need process. The courts, in deciding what effect to give
the plan in light of the antitrust laws, must take their cue from Congress, and Congress has not seen fit to give the agencies any power to
implement the plan directly. Indeed, Congress has been ambivalent
-from the beginning concerning the legal effect of health plans and the
wisdom of granting plan-implementing powers. Under all the circumstances, the Justice Department's ruling seems correct.
IL. THE National Gerimedical Case
The leading authority to date on the reconciliation of the federal
health planning laws and the antitrust laws is the National Gerimredical
case. Although the events that occasioned that litigation occurred prior
to the 1979 amendments, the Supreme Court had occasion to refer to
the later legislation in its opinion. Although the case required only a
decision on the application of the implied repeal doctrine, the Court
laid the groundwork for the Fourth Circuit's implied amendment doctrine in an ill-considered footnote, which will be discussed separately.
A.

The Implied Repeal Issue

In National Gerimedical. the Supreme Court reversed the lower
courts' inference that Public Law 93-641 created a broad antitrust exemption for the health care industry. The lower courts' rulings" reflected af2reement with dictum in 1Huron Valle; Hlospital. Inc. v. itj"(&f
Pontiac, an earlier district court decision. Even though neither of
these cases presented a good opportunity for the defendants to invoke
the implied repeal doctrine, the various courts all decided the easy case
before them by stating general principles that have troublesome implications for other cases, including the CVHSA problem.
The defendant in National Gerimedical was a Missouri Blue Cross
plan that had adopted a reimbursement policy similar to that adopted
by the Blue Cross plan in Rex following invalidation of the North Carolina certificate-of-need law. Without such a law in effect in Missouri.
41. 479 F. Supp. 1012 (W.D. Mo. 1979). af#'d. 682 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1980). rer'd. 452 U S
378 11981).
42 466 F Supp. 1301. 1312 (E.D. M ich. 1979). 'aremed. 666 F.2d 1029 (61h Cir. 1981).
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Blue Cross had refused, as a cost-containment measure, to enter into a
reimbursement contract with a new hospital built without the approval
of the local HSA. The hospital sued Blue Cross, claiming that the antitrust laws required it to deal with any hospital that would like to have
its services offered on favorable terms as part of the Blue Cross package. Instead of addressing the validity of this claim-which, incidentally. is highly questionable 4 3 -,the district court held that, by virtue of
Public Law 93-641, "the antitrust laws were not intended to apply to
members of the health care industry, clearly acting within the scope of
the Act."" This conclusion, like the dictum of the Huron Valley district court, was based on the implicit rejection in Public Law 93-641 of
competition and market forces as constructive influences in the health
care industry. The court of appeals in National Gerinmedical affirmed
this reasoning of the lower court, quoting at length from its opinion.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the lower courts on the
ground that antitrust scrutiny of Blue Cross's conduct would not conflict with the operation of any federal or state regulatory scheme. The
Court simply applied the implied repeal doctrine, which had been
largely ignored by the lower courts, holding once again that the Sherman Act is to be reconciled with the specific mandates of regulatory
statutes and not swept aside altogether in the presence of regulation. It
thus easily rejected the claim that Congress had created "a 'pervasive'
repeal of the antitrust laws as applied to every action taken in response
to the health-care planning process."" Unfortunately. in deciding the
easy case before it. the Court attached weight to several factors whose
absence or presence in a later, harder case might be taken as indicating
that an exemption should be inferred. In general, Justice Powell's
opinion indicated a possible willingness, in a future case, to accept emanations from a statute and its legislative history as a basis for inferring
an exemption and thus not to require a specific conflict between statutory regimes before setting aside antitrust law.4 6 The discussion below
43. See 452 U S at 393 n.19. Except in unusual circumstances. antitrust law does not imptse
on one party a duty to deal with another pany or require justifications for refusals to deal. -.
United States v Colgate & Co.. 250 U.S. 300 1919): Official Airline Guides. Inc. v. FTC. 30 F.2d
Q20 (1980). rert. denied. 450 U.S. 917 (1981). Indeed. the freedom to select one's suppliers or
customers is the essence of competition. Thus. the plaintiffin NalionalGerimedwal. though winning on the immunity point, should not prevail on the merits unless it could establish that Blue
Cross. rather than being an independent actor, was in a conspiracy with plaintitls hospital compctitors or was controlled by them. Seesupra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. If competitors
control a dominant financing entity with the power to fixprices and exclude competitors. some
distinct antitrust problems are presented. See Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue
Shield. 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980): Federal Trade Commission. Physician Agreements to Control Medical Prepayment Plans. 46 Fed. Reg. 48982 (1981) (enforcement policy statement).
44. 479 F. Supp. at 1021.
45. 452 U S. at 393.
46. In United States v. National Asbn of Securities Dealers. 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
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of how the problem raised by the CVHSA ruling request might be handled in light of the National Gerimnedical decision demonstrates the
need to confine that decision to its facts and the issues actually litigated.
The main source of difficulty in National Gerirnedical is the Court's
footnote 18."' which may be read to resolve in the health planners'
favor the problem raised by the CVHSA's ruling request. Although
such issues were not before the Court and were not fully explored or
argued. Justice Powell may have paradoxically broadened the impact
of the Court's decision when he attempted to narrow its scope by emphasizing that -our holding does not foreclose future claims of antitrust
immunity in other factual contexts." By signaling the Court's possibly
favorable view of a situation "where. . . an HSA has expressly advocated a form of cost-saving cooperation among providers," Justice
Powell's footnote implied that he, at least, would accept the argument
that the antitrust laws do not apply to HSA-inspired joint ventures and
that he might even hold exempt a naked market-division agreement of
the CVHSA type if ratified by an HSA." Though footnote 18 is far
from being definitive or binding, its implied legal conclusion is questionable: it is doubtful that the Court would make it explicit if it heard
fuller argument.
The Court's footnote hinting at approval of CVHSA-type agreements results from Justice Powell's misapplication of the implied repeal
doctrine and from his attempt to sense Congress's intentions concernSupreme Court held. 5-4. that cenain practices restricting the making of a sccondary market in
niutual lund hares ,ere not subject to the antitrust laws because of certain provisions in the
federal ,ecurities lavs Justice Powell's opinion for the majority did not identif%any ,pecilic conilct necc%,sitatin the inference of a congressional intent to set aside antitrust rules but appeared
mitead to inter the exemption solely on the basi% ofa general and unexertised power o1 regulators
oter.ilht I houch eas ing lip ,ervice to the "clear repugnanc.- requirement. Justice Powell did
not Ippl. it rigoroul% This case s exceptional in its application of the implied repeal doctrine.
how.eser. and need not be read as permanenrl altering its requirement for **clear repugnanc
47 452 t S at 393 This footnote reads In its entirety as followv
.ecsrtheless. becau.e ('ongress has remained coninced that competition does not operate
cllectis,,
in
romeparts of the health care mdustr'. r-... 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2(b) ( 1976 cd.
Sapp IV). we empha!,si,
that our holding does%not foreclose future claim:. of antitrust immunit% in other lactual contexts. Although fauring a reer.al in this case. the United State. a.
antuu cu'rae A.iserts that 'there are some activities that must, by implication, be immune
from .ntitrust attack if lISAs and State Agencies are to exercise their authori,.cd power.,.
Brief for the United States as .4mieuw Curiae 16. n. 11. Where. for example. an IISA has
exprcs,l, ad%.ocated a form of cost-saving co-operation among providers, it may be that antitru,t immunit% i, 'necessary to make the INliPRDAI work.* Silver v. New York Stock Exchange. 373 US. 341. 357 (1963). See 124 Cos.. Rt:c. If 11.963 (daily cd. Oct. 10. 1978)
(Rep. Rogers ("The intent of Congress was that I IS
,sand providers who voluntarily work
with them in carning out the IISA's statutory mandate should not be subject to the antitrust
laws If the, were. Public Law 93-641 simply could not he implemented.*) Such a case
w%
ould diler substantially from the present one, where the conduct at issue is not ctperation
among providers. hut an insurer's refusal to deal with a provtider that failed to heed the
ads.ace ol an lISA.
4t Ve tqra note 79
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ing the implementation of planners' goals by interpolating from
vaguely revealed sentiments rather than by applying the statute. Like
both of the lower courts in Gerimedical and the district court in Huron
Valley, Justice Powell gave particular weight to Congressman Paul
Rogers' 1978 assertion on the floor of the House (apropos of no pending legislation) that, if the antitrust laws were applied to curb competitor collaboration supportive of planning, "Public Law 93-641 simply
could not be implemented.""' The courts' general acceptance of this
crucial statement of fact is surprising, to say the least, since it is not
supportable in any literal sense. The antitrust laws do not prohibit all
collective actions that competitors might take ° and do not apply at all
to voluntary compliance with duly promulgated health plans by individual providers or to compliance that is coerced by the force of public
opinion or by a felt need to curry favor with the regulators. More generally, the antitrust laws could not prevent achievement of the act's
main objective, which was to induce state adoption of federally approved certificate-of-need laws governing new investment.
What Congressman Rogers apparently meant by his indefensible
statement-and the idea that must have caused Justice Powell to cite
that statement as the basis for suggesting a "clear repugnancy" between
the planning act and the antitrust laws-was that Congress must have
intended to supply some specific means of rationalizing the delivery
system and of eliminating unneeded health facilities from the market.
These were, after all, results that Congress certainly seemed to desire.
Because it was unclear how, other than by voluntary compliance, actual rationalizations or reductions in services could occur without an
antitrust exemption, Congressman Rogers wanted, and Justice Powell
felt called upon to supply, such an exemption for private entities who
might collaborate to further these purposes.
Judicial provision, under this analysis, of the tools necessary for implementation might make sense if Congress were always logical and
consistent. But one cannot assume that Congress always intends to
supply the means to achieve its stated aspirations. Indeed, the legislative history of Public Law 93-641, particularly the appropriateness review provision, reveals that Congress consciously withheld from the
planner-regulators the specific powers needed to implement cutbacks in
services. 5 ' Despite all the rhetoric, the congressional committees had
49.

124 Co.-G. REC. H 11.963 (daily ed. Oct. 10. 1978).

50. Even under the antitrust analysis favored here. planners may still broker efficiency-enhancing agreements among competitors that do not unduly threaten to undercut competition in
the wader market. Thus. the planning act's support for multi-institutional arrangements and
shared services in no way supports the argument that Congress must have intended an antitrust
exemption.
51 See 44 Fed. Reg. 71.754 (1979) (D11EW recounts the legislative history of the appropri-
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real policy doubts about implementing such plans and political doubts
about extending the regulators' power. Moreover, as noted earlier,
Congress dropped language specifically contemplating informal HSA
efforts to implement findings of excess capacity. Given this history, the
idea that Congress must have intended an antitrust exemption does not
stand scrutiny. Congress might easily have expected that its desire to
reduce capacity. though expressed, would go unrealized unless and until it was implemented either in later amendments, for which currently
stated aspirations might pave the way, or by the states.
In light of these observations, it is particularly significant that. in
writing the 1979 amendments with specific knowledge of the CVHSA
issue and of the planners' frustration, Congress was still unwilling to
grant to HSAs this new implementation power and wrote legislative
history expressly accepting the antitrust consequences. Instead of laying the basis for an implied antitrust exemption. which it was invited to
do.52 Congress authorized funds for the purpose of buying out excess
capacity.": thereby pursuing the goal of system reduction and rationalization by a totally different means. Thus was Congressman Rogers'
minor premise also invalidated. Obviously, the 1979 amendments' explicit reintroduction of competition as a positive value in the industry 4
must also weigh in favor of leaving antitrust its accustomed role in the
absence of a specific conflict.
B. Foreshadowings of an Implied Amendment Doctrine
Because there was no real conflict, let alone "clear repugnancy." between Public Law 93-641 and the antitrust laws. Justice Powell's apparent receptiveness in footnote 18 to an antitrust exemption for CVHSAtype agreements appears to rest on a different, seemingly unprecedented ground-specifically. the existence in a statute or its legislative
history of a general congressional finding that competition does not
work well in the industry in question. Indeed. Justice Powell's footnote
was explicitly occasioned "because Congress has remained convinced
that competition does not operate effectively in some parts of the health
care industry." Whatever alterations of antitrust policies might be recognized on the basis of congressional distrust of competition. they
would seldom amount to a total exemption for particular parties or for
ateness review provisions in its comments on the final rcgulitions). Appropriatenes. reviws.
which IHSAs were required to undertake periodically, involve assessment of the current need for
existing facilities. Obviously. a finding that a type of facilty or service was in oversupply or that a
particular provider was unneeded is pregnant with termination possibilities. But Congress. having
considered providing for decertification. left it at that.
52. See C. ItAVIGIHURST. supra note 37. at 137-40.
53. See Pub. L No. 96-79. § 301 (codified in 42 U.S.C. .' 300t- IIto -14 (Supp. V 1981)).
54. See C. IIAVIGIIURST. supra note 37. at 142-48.
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a particular class of acts or practices. Thus, where Congress. despite its
reservations about competition. has provided only an incomplete regulatory regime to substitute for market forces, the courts, instead of finding an exemption, would probably impute to Congress only an
intention to lessen the rigor of the normal antitrust rules. To the extent
that a court finds that Congress has relaxed the rules without creating a
total immunity, it is more accurate to say that it has inferred an amendment of the antitrust laws than to say that it has found an implied exemption. Though using the language of the implied repeal doctrine.
footnote 18 looked toward inferring an implied amendment.
The lower courts in National Gerimedicaland Huron Valle Hospital
relied heavily on the finding, appearing in the 1974 Senate committee
report on Public Law 93-641, that -the health services industry does not
respond to classic marketplace forces. ' " Unlike those courts, however.
the Supreme Court refused to base a blanket exemption on this language and the 1974 law, finding instead that the planning act "is not so
incompatible with antitrust concerns as to create a 'pervasive' repeal."b
Nevertheless, footnote 18 revealed that the Court was still troubled by
Congress's doubts about health care competition, which it documented
by citing the 1979 statutory finding that "the effect of competition on
decisions of providers respecting the supply of health services and facilities is diminished. . . [by] the prevailing methods of paying for health
services by public and private health insurers, particularly for inpatient
. . . and other institutional health services .... "" The Court apparently read this language as calling for some relaxation of antitrust doctrine even in the absence of a specific conflict between that doctrine and
the regulatory scheme. This intimation of a willingness to infer an implied amendment based on other statutes appears to have led the Rex
court into attempting to find in the pre-1974 legislation a basis for
framing a milder antitrust rule to cover the defendants' participation in
health planning.
IV.

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLIED AMENDMENT DOCTRINE IN
THE HEALTH PLANNING CONTEXT

In National Society of ProfessionalEngineers v. United States " the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the long-standing antitrust principle that the
possible social benefits of an anticompetitive practice cannot be invoked to justify harm to competition. That decision indicated that.
55. S. REp. No. 1285. 93d Cong.. 2d Sss. 39. reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Ni.ws 7842. 7878.
56. 452 U.S. at 393.

57. 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2b)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
58 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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under the rule of reason, competitors may collaborate on a scale dangerous to competition only if the result of their collaboration is
procompetitive--cither in making the market more effectively competitive overall or in integrating resources to create a new product or service. or to achieve production efficiency, that could not be produced or
achieved by collaboration on a lesser scale. Most recently. in Arikona ,.
Maricopa County Medical Societv, a 4-3 majority ruled that a powerful
physician organization could not defend its members' practice of agreeing on maximum fees payable by insurance carriers on the ground that,
even though the practice removed a vast number of price determinations from the competitive arena, it benefitted consumers."9 In both of
these cases, the Court stressed that Congress should be looked to for
whatever exceptions should be made on policy grounds to the general
principle that competition should not be impaired by private
agreements."
The implied amendment doctrine implicit in the National Gerinedical footnote and explicit in the Rex holding is true, on its face at least.
to the principle that Congress, not the courts, makes the nation's antitrust policy. It raises, however, serious questions about how congressional policy is determined. On one level, the issue is one of statutory
construction and the proper allocation of tasks and responsibilities between courts and legislature. On another level, there are questions specific to the making of a sound national health policy. An evaluation of
the putative implied amendment doctrine under these headings leads to
the conclusion that the implied repeal doctrine, which demands that
Congress be clear and specific in setting aside the antitrust laws. is the
superior technique for ascertaining congressional intent.
59 457 U S 332 (1982). The decision can be criticized for not making the povcr of thie
sponMoring organization an explicit element of the per se offense. Without po'er as a factol.
ariujhls eflhcient arrangements would be absolutely foreclosed even though the percentec o
competitors involhed was not unneccssarily large or was not so large as to alter the probabilit of
net procompetative effects The Court also relied unnecessarily and with apparent approA on
three troublesome cases that should have been either ignored or cited in terms casting doubt on
their continuing validit: United States v. Topco Assocs.. Inc.. 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (Joint %enture
of modet size held guilt- of the per se offense of market division despite a strong claim of cflicenav). Albrecht v. Herald Co.. 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (vertical imposition of maximum resale price
equated with fixing of minimum price despite benefit to consumers). Kiefer-Ste art Co. V.Jo.eph
E Seagram & Sons. 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (similar). See Gerhart. The Supreme Cour! and,4nilrurt
Anraulit. The 0Near) Triumph of the Chicago School. 1982 SUP. CT Ri-v. 319. Despite these deficiencies in the opinion, the Maricopa result is defensible on the ground that the defendant joint
'entures embraced substantial proportions of the physicians in the market, were sponsored by the
organzed medical profession. threatened to preclude or inhibit competitive innovation, and of.
fered no obvious cfficiencies not obtainable by organizing on a lesser scale. Cf.Ilavighurst &
I ackharth. 1Enforcing the Rules of Free Enterprise in an Imperfect ,tfat'ez: The Ca.e of Indidual
Practice.4.rtsocataons. in A Nhw APPROACH TOThE. Eco.OMKs Of- II-.ALTiI CARL. 3_7 (MI. Olson
ed. 1981).
60 435 U.S at 689-90. 457 U.S. at 354-55.
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A.

Deducing Antitrust Policies through Emanations

The history of federal health planning legislation demonstrates the
impossibility of determining at any given moment Congress's precise
policy toward competition in particular sectors of the economy. The
pre-1974 statutory situation, which concerned the court in Re.r, defied
any assessment of Congress's specific antitrust policy toward hospitals.
At that time, the antitrust laws had never been enforced to an appreciable degree in the hospital industry; and Congress might reasonably
have believed, until the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Rex, that
hospitals were largely outside its antitrust jurisdiction. In that event, of
course, Congress would have had no occasion to have any antitrust policy at all with respect to hospitals6 and might have turned to health
planning only as a second-best alternative. Under such circumstances,
any judicial divination of a specific congressional intention to immunize Sherman Act violations would seem disingenuous. Without real
guidance from Congress. the court can be accused of making statutory
law, not finding it.
The adoption of Public Law 93-641 in 1974 provided more evidence
of congressional support for health planning, but Congress still took no
position directly conflicting with antitrust law. Nevertheless, Justice
Powell appeared ready, in footnote 18, to relax the usual requirement
of "clear repugnancy" and to supply such relief from antitrust strictures
as health planners would need in order to achieve Congress's stated..
aspirations. In thus deducing congressional intentions, however, he
failed to appreciate the possibility, so strikingly illustrated in the foregoing discussion of this legislation, of inconsistencies between Congress's declared ends and legislated means. Precisely because Congress
frequently obfuscates when it can settle on no corporate intent, it must
be concluded that considerable wisdom underlies the customary rule
under which a congressional intention to create an antitrust exemption
is not "lightly" inferred. Without an up-or-down vote on antitrust immunity or on a mandate directly incompatible with antitrust doctrine,
judicial imputation of a purpose to alter antitrust rules runs a serious
risk of misreading congressional purposes, perhaps to suit the predilections of the judges.
The reliance placed by several courts on the 1974 Senate committee's
finding that "the health services industry does not respond to classic
61. It isclear that a congressional belief that a particular area is beyond its jurisdiction does
not warrant a finding that it did not intend the antitrust laws to apply to that area. United States
v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). Rut see Flood v. Kuhn. 407 U.S. 258
(1972) (explicit judicial holding, plus congressional inaction, justify adherence to rule of stare
decisis}.
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marketplace forces"' - provides another illustration of the difficulty of
divining Congress's intentions concerning important policy issues when
it has not spoken definitively. In its report on the 1979 amendments.
the same committee restated the quoted proposition almost in haec
'erba but with a crucial amendment: "Inthe view of the committee the
health care industry has not responded to classic marketplace forces.'' 3
Underscoring its new perception. the committee immediately repeated
and amplified that thought:
Despite the fact that the health care industry has not to daie responded
to classic marketplace forces, the committee believes that the planning
process-at the Federal. State, and local level-should encourage competitive forces in the health services industry wherever competition and
consumer choice can constructively serve to advance the purposes of
quality assurance and cost effectiveness."

By amending its earlier overgeneralization and affirming its faith in
competition in at least some circumstances, the Senate committee upset
any antitrust policy conclusions that might have been drawn on the
basis of the report and legislation adopted just five years earlier. This
episode reveals perfectly why it is dangerous for courts to impute to
Congress an intention to set aside the antitrust laws when such an intention has been neither declared nor revealed by specific action. Similarly, the House committee report on the 1979 legislation showed that
Congress was. after all. quite comfortable with the idea that the antitrust laws would be given their normal effect except where its action
had created a specific conflict requiring an exemption. 5
For yet another powerful illustration of the dangers of trying to read
major policy significance into Congress's reservations concerning the
functioning of a particular market, it is only necessary to turn to the
language from the 1979 amendments"' that was cited by the Supreme
Court in its National Gerimedical footnote to illustrate Congress's belief
"'that competition does not operate effectively in some parts of the
health care industry." That language. which was part of a lengthy instruction to health system planners and regulators concerning the
weight that they should give to competition in carrying out their assigned duties, expressed doubt-perhaps even more than doubt"'about the value of competition in the provision of "inpatient . . .and

other institutional health services. "6'

As a guide to antitrust policy.

62 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
63

S Rip. No. 96. 96th Cong.. 1st Sess. 52 (1979) (emphasis added).

64. Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
65 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
66. 42 U S.C. § 300k-2(b) (quoted in text supra note 57).
67. See 45 Fed. Reg. 69.771 (1980) (DllS states that "Congress has stated that market
horce, do not or will not appropriately allocate supply for inpatient serviccs").
68

,aional GertMedical. 452 U.S. at 388 n.13.
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however, that statutory finding is dangerously unreliable and imprecise." For one thing, some services falling easily within the statutory
definition of "institutional health services" are entirely amenable to
competition.' More importantly, the possibility existed even then that
changes in "the prevailing methods of paying for health services"
would in due course improve the feasibility of competition in the provision of inpatient care; indeed, the legislative history specifically anticipated such changes."' Given the rapidly changing character of the
marketplace. one may ask how Justice Powell or anyone else could
know at any given point whether Congress still "remained convinced
that competition does not operate effectively . . .,,2
It might be suggested, in view of this latter problem, that the courts
themselves should appraise the benefits of competition in a given market for a given health care service at a given moment. 73 Nevertheless.
because such an inquiry would be so complex that only a regulatory
agency could reasonably be expected to undertake it, it seems unlikely
that Congress intended antitrust courts to make such judgments. 4
Moreover, the courts have heretofore resisted the adoption of legal
rules that would place on the government in enforcing the Sherman
Act the burden of ascertaining from day to day whether powerful combinations of competitors have abused their powers or whether previ-.
ously reasonable practices have "become unreasonable through the
mere variation of economic conditions."' 3 Not only would evolution in
private financing methods raise continual questions concerning the appropriateness of the prevailing antitrust rule, but changes in federal reimbursement policies would have to be appraised for evidence of
changes in Congress's policy toward competition. For example. one
can ask whether Justice Powell would consider that the 1979 finding
upon which he relied is weakened or rendered obsolete by recent Medi69 See C. IIAv1,IIURST. jupra note 37. at 267.71 (arguing that the presumption against the
%orkabiaht- of competition isrebuttable, not conclusive).
70 Id. at 270.
71. II.R RE.P. No. 190..nipra note 36. at 53-54.
72..Vtonal Gertmedical. 452 U.S. at 393 n.18.
73. Although it ishard to tell. this may be the view advanced in Comment. Antitrt Imp/iration.r
]f
lealth Planning: National Gerimedical Hospital and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross
of Kansas City. 8 A.m. .L.& MED. 321 (1982). On the other hand, the student commentator
turned for analytical help only to scholarship aimed at clarifying mainstream antitrust doctrine.
E.g.. Brodley. Joint Ventures andAntiru.rtPolicy. 95 HARV. L. REv. 1523 (1982). Thus. she may
not have been advocating a special. relaxed antitrust standard after all.
74. In the 1960"s. Congress and the Supreme Court went back and forth over the question
whether "banking factors" other than competition should be given weight in the evaluation of
bank mergers. Although Congress finally expressly required the courts to consider more than
effects on competition in such cases, the courts have never been comfortable with the balancing
task assigned to them. See general" P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 949-52 (3d ed. 1981).
75. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.. 273 U.S. 392. 397-98 (1927).
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care amendments7 6 substituting prospectively determined rates of payment to hospitals for retrospective cost reimbursement, which was 'the
prevailing method of paying for health services" in 1979.
Although the Court in National Gerimedical spoke only of implied
exemptions. its rejection of blanket immunity suggested the need for
new substantive antitrust rules that would distinguish permissible from
impermissible anticompetitive action in response to health planners' initiatives. The most obvious problem that the Court would face in applying this novel doctrine of implied amendment would be in knowing
how and where to relax the law. For example, would an HSA's approval of an anticompetitive agreement between hospitals be sufficient
to exempt it even in the absence of judicial or state agency review of
that approval? (The Court implied elsewhere in its opinion that the
HSA in Missouri, as a private rather than a governmental body. could
not have conferred immunity on Blue Cross even if it had instructed
Blue Cross to act as it did.") Would a possibly unreviewable7 I finding
in a state health plan of competition's inappropriateness with respect to
all hospital care confer immunity on a hospital monopolist or a hospital merger?
Another question illustrating the confusion into which an implied
amendment theory would lead is whether an HSA could insulate all or
only certain types of anticompetitive agreements among hospitals. In
suggesting that exemptions might cover some but not all otherwise
questionable conduct, footnote 18 stated that "cooperation among
providers" (query whether this includes a naked CVHSA-type marketdivision agreement 7") differs substantially from the refusal to deal by
Blue Cross at issue in National Gerimedical. Antitrust law provides no
doctrinal basis. however, for tolerating one of these forms of conduct
and not the other. Indeed, contrary to the Court's implication, competitor agreements are usually regarded with greater suspicion than unilateral refusals to deal, which are probably not unlawful at all.")
In view of the impossibility of knowing what specific implications to
draw from congressionally expressed doubt about competiti.on's current
value in a particular setting, the courts should adhere to their traditional insistence that Congress alone must declare those implications.
76 Social Security Amendments of 1983. Pub. L. No. 98-21. 1983 U.S. CooL CoN(,. & At)
NI.ws (97 Slat.) 149.
77. 452 U.S. at 390.
78. The importance of rcviewability by a government agency or a court is suggested by Silver
v.Ncw York Stock Exch.. 373 U.S. 341. 357-61 (1963). On reviewability of lISA dcterminations
and health plans. see C. HAVIGIJURST. .nupra note 37. at 274-77.
79. Although Justice Powcll might have bcn willing to exempt even such a naked restraint.
.ree supra note 46. the term he used. "cost-saving cooperation." might not apply to such market
division. See supra text and accompanying note 48.
80 See rupra note 43.
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If the courts instead undertake to make their own judgments about
when an exemption or relaxation of substantive rules is or is not appropriate, they will have "set sail on a sea of doubt"' which ninety years
of antitrust jurisprudence should have taught them to avoid. 2 The
wisdom of the "clear repugnancy" test, rigorously applied, is revealed
by the difficulty and subjective artificiality of trying first to guess what
was in the back of Congress's collective mind and then to fashion a
different, milder antitrust regime to fit a situation where competition
has been declared a mixed blessing. Thus, an implied amendment doctrine has no place in antitrust law.
B.

Health Planningand Health Polic;

The wisdom of softening the requirements of antitrust law for health
care providers subject to congressionally sponsored health planning
may be considered separately from the legal issue of whether the law
does in fact soften such requirements. Obviously, courts are not immune to letting their policy judgments guide their thinking on such
legal questions. Although the court of appeals in Rex was probably
more influenced by the seeming harshness of the treble-damage penalty
should a violation be found, Justice Powell, who is not known as an
antitrust enthusiast, seemed to respond to policy considerations in writing footnote 18. Some thoughts on the policy issue may therefore be
worth recording in order that other courts will not accept too quickly
the common argument that applying antitrust law rigorously to health
planning activities has necessarily perverse effects on the public
interest.
Local health planning has always had some of the earmarks of a
cartel. Planning agencies developed originally at the local level to
serve a variety of functions, including both the establishment of priorities for using philanthropic and governmental (Hill-Burton) funds and
the allocation of service and geographic markets among hospitals anxious to minimize competition. "3 Eventually, with the growth of health
insurance and public financing, the agencies were no longer greatly
concerned about curbing competition for limited funds and for pricesensitive customers. Increasingly, the public expected the agencies to
limit the system's exploitation of open-ended financing sources and to
curb emerging nonprice competition, which was driving the system to
incur unjustified costs. Reducing competition, originally undertaken
81. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.. 85 F. 271. 284 (6th Cir. 1898). This opinion
by Judge (later Chief Justice) William Howard Taft is the classic expression in antitrust law of the
need to focus on competition alone and not to balance it against other supposed values.
82. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
83 See lHavighurst. Regulation of Ilealth Facilitiesand Services by "Ceriqcateof Need." 59
VA L. Ri-.v. 1143. 1148-50 (1973).
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voluntarily by providers for their own benefit, thus became a goal of
public policy.
As regulatory powers were increasingly conferred on the health planning agencies, nonprovider interests, some of them antagonistic to
providers, were given a voice in the planning process. Introducing consumer interests in this way can be viewed as an attempt to democratize
the cartel. Nevertheless, Congress did not see fit to extend full regulatory (plan implementation) powers to the local agencies, even with
their new participatory processes and the political accountability supplied by state agency oversight. Thus, in its reluctance to embrace
finally and completely the idea that a provider cartel could be made
democratic and accountable enough to define and serve the public interest, Congress revealed the same distrust of private power in which
the antitrust tradition is rooted. Moreover, the emerging national distrust of economic regulation, which has so often served private rather
than public interests, was also evident in Congress's hesitancy to embrace centralized decisionmaking. Courts should be careful to respect
Congress's feelings on these matters.
In addition to being consistent with broad policy traditions and
trends. maintaining an antitrust check on the health planners serves the
salutary purpose of calling attention to the broad implications of relying too heavily on cartel-like private cooperation to allocate health resources. Thus, the Justice Department's legal position put Congress
squarely in the position in 1979 of having to face head-on the hard
policy questions on which it had been less than explicit in the past: Did
it really want to invest the planning agencies, with their cartel-like features, with plenary powers? What additional safeguards in the nature
of regulatory oversight and procedural openness and due process
should be introduced before granting these agencies the power to confer antitrust immunity on private arrangements? Is there an alternative
to relying on regulation and on "benign" cartels to allocate resources in
this industry? Should competition have an active role? Should competition be placed wholly at the mercy of the planners and regulators and
allowed to function only with their concurrence? As demonstrated
above, Congress was not prepared to go along with the planners' view
on these matters. Better health policy is likely to.result if the courts
force Congress to face issues squarely by requiring that it speak clearly.
Even though a policy of relying on competition in health care sometimes produces perverse short-term effects, the state of affairs that gives
rise to this problem is not inevitable and can change, making more
services amenable to effective discipline by market forces in the consumer interest. Antitrust enforcement based solely on the perception
that the financing system is currently dysfunctional may serve strongly
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol14/iss1/6
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to confirm and reinforce the system's dysfunctional features. For example, acceptance of even a modified cartel form of organization may
discourage third-party payers from attempting to get providers to compete among themselves. Even if third parties should undertake such
efforts, the market's cartel characteristics might reduce the prospects for
their success. Thus, if health planners are permitted to foster cartel
behavior, the emergence of effective competition could easily be frustrated." Judicial softening of antitrust rules could therefore directly
and significantly interfere with the realization of attainable goals of antitrust policy.
Perhaps the best reason for not relaxing the antitrust laws to make
way for health planning is the need for a sharp break with the health
care industry's tradition of relying on cooperation rather than competition to solve any problem identified by providers or by an aroused public. The antitrust laws are now being invoked to break down the
traditional power of organized providers, and the procompetition provisions in the 1979 amendments represented another challenge to the
health planning tradition of centralized decisionmaking and cooperation. These and other developments have begun to cause a widespread
reexamination of established practices and assumptions, but there are
still many signs that the message has not gotten through. Thus, it is
desirable for the courts to direct the planners' efforts away from fostering noncompetitive behavior. Given the deep-seated tradition of suppressing competition in the name of planning, the agencies require a
very clear directive to place their emphasis elsewhere. The Rex decision, even though it relates to ancient history, sends a particularly disappointing signal in this regard.
V.

CONCLUSION

The court of appeals decision in Rex can be read as unimportant
insofar as it concerns application of the Sherman Act to the involvement of private parties in voluntary health planning. The result appears generally consistent with antitrust doctrine in requiring the jury
to base any finding of the hospitals' anticompetitive intent on evidence
other than their participation in the development of local health plans.
Even if the court's holding is taken at face value as 'a relaxation of
normal antitrust rules in order to accommodate Congress's support for
voluntary health planning, today's legislation is so different that the
rule of the case is unlikely to have any effect on the legality of current
activities of a comparable nature.
84. For discussion of another situation involving a temptation to relax antitrust requirements
in pursuit of short-run cost savings. see Havighurst & Hackbanh. supra note 59.
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On another level, however, the Rex decision has significant implications for the substance of antitrust law in industries that have been explicitly or implicitly identified by Congress, perhaps in legislation
providing for limited public or private regulation or voluntary "planning." as being inadequately or inappropriately disciplined by market
forces. The thesis of this article has been that both the Rex decision
and the Supreme Court's footnote dictum in National Gerimedical,
which foreshadowed the Rex court's theory of statutory construction,
were mistaken in suggesting that modifications of antitrust doctrine
should or can sensibly be devised to accommodate congressional misgivings about the value of competition in particular circumstances. As
an illustration of the confusion and error into which the Fourth Circuit's implied amendment doctrine can lead, the experience of courts
and others in trying to reconcile federal health planning legislation
with the antitrust laws is unsurpassed. From the misreadings of congressional purpose and the bad health policy that resulted from attributing to Congress policies toward the health care industry that it had
not definitively declared, one can learn the dangers of departing from
the traditional implied repeal doctrine, with its insistence that the antitrust laws be enforced in accordance with precedent unless Congress
has unambiguously revealed a contrary intent.
From this review of the courts' attempts to divine congressional policy from between the lines of statutes and legislative history also come
some useful lessons about how policymaking responsibility should be
allocated between Congress and courts sitting in antitrust cases. Because special interests are constantly probing for soft spots in Congress's basic policy of enforcing competition, there are good reasons for
the courts to hold Congress to a high standard of clarity and to refuse
to supply antitrust dispensations that have not been expressly granted.
If Congress wants to confer an exemption or to change an antitrust
rule, it is always free to do so. The implied repeal doctrine puts Congress on notice that it must face issues, not evade them in the hope that
the courts will do its legislative job.
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